This will be a Survey Research and will collect information from the Daadab and Kakuma Refugee camps as well as Eastleigh area in Nairobi. The research will also collect data from experts in the area of asylum and refugee laws. It will also collect data from key informants in UNHCR, the Ministry of Foreign of Foreign Affairs – Kenya and Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Somalia. The Survey design was selected due to its strength in generating very accurate results and its high degree of reliability.

ABSTRACT

Somalia has experienced the worst of civil strife and conflict in the East African region over the past two decades. This started in 1991 after the ouster of the then President Siad Barre. Since then Somalia has not had an effective central government. This coupled with a myriad of other challenges including climatic factors like drought and famine and seemingly never-ending conflicts has seen tens of thousands of Somalis flee across the borders to neighboring countries. In the recent past there have been talks to repatriate the Somali refugees as there seems to be relative calm that has returned to the country courtesy of the operations of the Kenya Defence Forces and AMISOM.

The question has been on how the repatriation is to be carried out. This research tries to find out how the repatriation program is to be carried out. It will also endeavour to investigate the challenges that may face the program. Are the refugees ready to be taken back home? The research will seek expert opinion from the officials in charge of repatriation program. These will include the officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kenya, the officials at the UNHCR and the Somali Somali Federal Government SFG. We will seek to find out the preparedness of the SFG on the refugees coming. We will also seek to find out and evaluate the forms of assistance that will be accorded the returnees both during their return to Somalia and when they are settling down.

The program is bound to have impacts on both Somalia as the refugees go back and on Kenya as the refugees leave. We will seek to investigate these impacts and measure them against actual outcomes. The refugees have been associated with rising insecurity in the host country; we will be interested to know whether their departure from the country guarantees ultimate security in the country. In essence the research will seek to evaluate the repatriation program in general and focus on the challenges, impacts and opportunities in particular.

INTRODUCTION

Background to the Somali problem

Somalia has experienced excessive amounts of political instability during the past two decades. Since President Mohammed Siyad Barre fled Somalia in January 27, 1991, Somalia descended into a state of anarchy. Conflicts and inter-clan rivalry became the order of the day. The conquest and ouster of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) by Ethiopian forces and its reincarnation as the Al-Shabaab has moved the situation in Somalia from bad to worse. The establishment of a government has proved to be extremely difficult and Somalia has remained a lawless nation for a very long time. This and the never ending conflicts has seen thousands of Somalis free the country into the neighbouring countries.

The main host countries to the Somali Refugees have been Kenya and Ethiopia, with Kenya taking the bulk of the refugee population. This has come with its own impacts and consequences, the latest being a rise in insecurity in Kenya. The general impact that refugees have on the receiving state include, but is not limited to, internal conflict, introduction of politically based issues, socio-economic challenges, resource scarcity, infrastructure inaccessibility, criminal activity, environmental degradation, and militarization of camps. It has been argued that the refugee camps in Kenya mainly in Kakuma and Daadab refugee camps in North Eastern Kenya have been used as entry points and conduits for small arms and light weapons into the country. It has even been argued that the refugee camps have been used as recruitment points for the Al-Shabaab militia group that has terrorized the region over the past decade. In response, Kenya adopted an informal camp policy for refugees, restricting their movement to the limited confines of refugee camps that in most cases are located in the most remote, poor, hostile, and undesirable parts of the country.

These among other problems has seen the Kenyan Defence Forces and later the AMISOM peace keeping forces move into Somalia in a bid to return sanity, calm and stability in the troubled Horn of Africa country. Through the concerted efforts of the forces and the Somali citizens still in Somalia the Al-Shabaab militia group strongholds in Somalia have been captured and are now under the control of the Somali Federal Government (SFG) of Somalia. However, the peace keeping forces continue to keep vigil in the country to ultimately dismantle the militia group.

The incursion of Somalia by the Kenyan Defence Forces in late 2011 in an effort to drive out and neutralize the Al-Shabaab militia group has seen some normalcy return to the war-torn Horn of Africa Country. The capturing of Kismayu – the militia’s stronghold and the continued military operation under the AMISOM umbrella promises stability of the entire country in the near future. However, lasting peace and stability is yet to be realized in some parts of the country still under the control of the militia group. Nevertheless there have been numerous calls to repatriate the Somali refugees back to their homeland so that they can participate in the national reconstruction of their country and also build their economy.

The UNHCR (United Nations agency in charge of refugee affairs), the Kenyan government and the Somali Federal Government have signed a Tripartite Agreement that will see hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees who are in Kenya return home. However, there are misgivings about the stability of the country and the ability of the Somali Federal Government to offer security to its citizens once they are back home. The question is: Is Somalia stable enough to operate as an independent state once the refugees are back home? Another question that also comes up is on the methodology to be adopted in repatriation: How do you repatriate? Do you take everybody back home by force or do they voluntarily leave? What if they don’t want to go back?

The Tripartite Agreement stipulated very clearly that the repatriation was to be voluntary. Only those who were ready and willing to go back would be assisted to go back home. The feeling and sentiments on the ground however, indicate that very few of the refugees are ready to go home. They don’t believe there is enough peace, security and stability yet for them to go back home. How are the countries hosting the refugees going to deal with this problem?

It is against this background that we sought to find out whether the repatriation program was going to be carried out. And if it is carried out how would it be carried out? What would be the impacts of the repatriation program on the refugees themselves, the host country in this case – Kenya – and the Somalia Federal Government? What are the challenges and opportunities of the program?

STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The UN Charter is quite elaborate on the issue of refugees seeking asylum in a host country. However, whether by default or design it remained silent on the issue of repatriation. Kenya is faced with a challenge in that the Somali refugee populations living within the country both within the refugee camps in North Eastern Kenya and the sparse Eastleigh suburb in Nairobi have been associated with rising insecurity in country. Consequently Kenya took it upon itself to ensure that peace and stability returned to the war-torn Horn of Africa country. A time has come when relative calm and peace has been realized in Somalia.

Kenya now wants the Somali refugees repatriated to their country. However, the feeling and the mood on the ground is different. Many Somali refugees are not ready to go back to Somalia. What will happen if none is ready to go back home? The research seeks to answer this question. What are the challenges and opportunities of the repatriation program as agreed upon in the Tripartite Agreement?

RESEARCH / STUDY OBJECTIVES

The general objective of the research will be:

a) To find out the impacts of repatriation of Somali refugees back to Somalia.

The specific objectives for the study will be:

a) To evaluate the procedure to be adopted in the repatriation process of Somali refugees.

b) To identify the effects of repatriation of Somali refugees on Kenya as a host country.

c) To find out the challenges of the repatriation process of Somali refugees back to Somalia.

LITERATURE REVIEW

THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT

Following the peace and stability that has been experienced in parts of Somalia in the recent past, the Kenyan government made a proposal to the UN Agency in charge of Refugees to help it in the repatriation of the Somali Refugees. The UN Agency having assessed the situation in Somalia, finally obliged to the repatriation proposal and a Tripartite Agreement was signed in November 2013. The Agreement was signed by Somalia, Kenya and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The Tripartite Agreement creates a framework for the voluntary repatriation of the refugees to Somalia. The agreement was signed on Sunday, November 10, 2013 by Kenya’s Foreign Secretary Amina Mohamed, Somalia’s Deputy Premier and Minister of foreign affairs Fowzia Yusuf Haji Aden and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The repatriation plan is expected to take three years and a Tripartite Commission was formed and tasked with working on the logistics of moving the over 560,000 refugees from Kenya back to Somalia.

Signing of the agreement became possible after formation of the Federal Government of the Republic of Somalia in August 2012 that allowed for open dialogue to gradually find solutions to Somali displacement. Consolidating peace in Somalia is challenging and the situation in parts of the country remains fragile. The process, however, is moving in the right direction and there are positive signs paving the way for solutions to displacement.

The UN refugee agency UNHCR pledged to assist nearly half a million registered Somali refugees in Kenya who opt to return to their homeland. This raises a number of questions: What kind of assistance will the UNHCR be able to offer the returnees? Who would measure whether it would be enough? What parameters would be used to gauge the level of assistance offered? UNHCR representative in Kenya Raouf Mazou said his organization will lead the way in mobilizing resources to ensure the repatriation of refugees is successful. Mazou said that there are approximately 1 million Somali refugees in Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Tanzania and Uganda.

"There is need for additional resources to ensure that Somali state is fully restored so that the returnees can find a conducive environment to sustain livelihoods," he said.

A key principle of the 1951 Refugee Convention, of which Kenya is a signatory, known as non-refoulement forbids the involuntary return of refugees to a country where the threat of persecution persists. This raises a number of questions: What would happen if the Somali refugees are not ready to go back to Somalia? Who can determine whether the threat of persecution still persists or not? The Tripartite Agreement defines the roles and responsibilities of the three parties in accordance with international standards.

"Among other things, this means any refugee has the right to choose whether to go home, after they have been given information about conditions on the ground in Somalia so they can make an informed decision," Mazou added. "It also means returns should be conducted in safety and dignity."

"It's very important to underline that no one is forcing Somalis to leave Kenya. The government and people of Kenya have tirelessly provided protection and assistance to Somali refugees for two decades. The agreement we signed on Sunday November 10, 2013 does not mean Kenya is no longer willing to do so," he said in a statement issued in Nairobi. This can only mean that the agreement was not binding. It is also an appreciation that some Somali refugees may not be willing to go back to Somalia. Hence the question, why sign the agreement in the first place? Was it really in the best interest of the refugees or there is more than meets the eye?

WHY REPATRIATE?

Echoing the sentiments of the UNHCR Kenya Representative, if Kenya was still willing to offer protection and assistance to the Somali refugees, why then were there calls and proposals to repatriate them. A number of reasons have been fronted as to why there is an urgent need to repatriate the Somali refugees. While most government officials point to the security question, there are a few people especially civil society officials and international agencies employees who view the move as purely politically motivated.

According to Kenya’s deputy president – Hon. William Ruto - who witnessed the signing of the tripartite agreement, Kenya presently hosts 610,000 documented refugees, out of which 520,000 are Somali living in designated refugee camps and various urban areas around the country. It is estimated that another 500,000 undocumented refugees reside in Kenya as well. According to Ruto, the sheer magnitude of documented and undocumented refugees has created an unprecedented security challenge for Kenya.

"Unfortunately, these challenges include terrorism, banditry as well as common criminals taking improper advantage of their refugee status," he said.

He noted that elements of the refugee population have also provided a conduit for the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Kenya. The government has made it clear that the continued hosting of Somali refugees now comes at too high a cost given the spike in terror attacks on Kenya. Foreign Affairs Cabinet Secretary Amina Mohammed said that Kenya has sustained a disproportionate share of the Somali Refugee crisis.

"The government has found itself straining financially as it sacrifices to raise the budget required to keep the camps secure and the refugees catered for. In spite of this, we have remained excellent neighbors and hosts of our brothers and sisters from Somalia. We have fully assumed our international obligations with regard to the hosting and protection of refugees,” she said.

The question that comes to mind when this is said is; Will Kenya be secure once the Somali refugees go back home? And if the refugees are still associated with the cases of rising insecurity in the country, do they still enjoy that option of voluntarily choosing to go back to Somalia or will there be instances when some will be forced out of the country? Will this not be in contravention of the Geneva Convention on the Law of Asylum and refugees?

The Foreign Affairs Cabinet Secretary said that Somalia is firmly in a post-conflict phase and the world has given its strongest indications ever that it will support its reconstruction. Somalia's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Fawzia Adam said that Somalia recognizes the huge financial burden that Kenya has shouldered as a result of hosting the refugees.

"We will therefore assist the refugees who return to Somalia so that they take part in nation building," she said.

Somalia’s Deputy Premier and Foreign Affairs Minister Fawzia Yusuf Adan said that the Somali Government has stabilized parts of the country, engaging refugees to return home and take part reconstructing their homeland. She added that the Federal Republic of Somalia is committed to creating conditions that will provide for the dignified repatriation of Somalia refugees from Kenya and other neighbouring countries.

“The government of Somalia recognizes the need for durable solutions for the refugees who are willing to return to Somalia to rebuild their lives. My government with the help of the international community shall put in place conditions conducive for the return of the refugees including administrative, judicial and security measures, to ensure the success of this exercises.”

However, despite the optimism of former Somali’s Deputy Premier the question of capacity of the Somali Government to offer what she is promised remains in the minds of many refugees. They are not sure the government is fully in control in Somalia. Many refugees still feel that Somalia is still unstable and insecure.

On her part Foreign Affairs Cabinet Secretary Amina Mohamed said discussions would continue adding that the two states have the best opportunity in two decades to work together to put Somalia’s past behind and help Somalis realize their long cherished dreams of a stable, united and peaceful nation.

“This is the beginning of a journey of hope, it’s the signal that we have been waiting for, it’s a signal that says that our brothers and sisters in Somalia are on track to full and effectively stabilize their country,” she said.

“Kenya needs a peaceful and secure neighbour… one that it can work with and develop this region. We are truly happy today that we are sending out that signal that normalcy is returning to Somalia,” Mohamed stated as she exuded confidence that the exercise will be successful.

On the other hand there are those that argue that the Tripartite Agreement is driven more by politics than by an assessment of the situation on the ground. It is a game of make-believe. Both governments are desperate for there to be peace in Somalia, but neither, despite their foreign financing and the support of 22,000 African Union troops, can defeat the rebel group Al-Shabaab. So instead, they focus on the cosmetics of peace – repatriation of the refugees. Britain, as a lead booster of the idea of peace in Somalia and vested in the outcome because of the London conferences, shares some of the blame for the forcing of the peace. The issue that then confronts us is what would be the impact of repatriating Somali refugees into a country that is still not stable and peaceful?

IMPACTS OF REPATRIATION OF SOMALI REFUGEES

There has been general consensus that the Al-Shabaab has not been wiped out of Somalia. They just moved from their strongholds and may actually be working underground. The spontaneous attacks in Mogadishu, Nairobi – Kenya, the refugee camps in Kenya among others are a confirmation that this militia group is still very active and alive. Can we then bury our heads in the sand and assume the AMISOM has conquered Somalia and the Al-Shabaab by extension. The repatriation of the Somali refugees into an unstable country with most of the parts still under the militia group may actually work against the efforts the African Union has made to stabilize the country.

While Katelo (Kenya's commissioner for refugee affairs at the Ministry of State for Immigration and Registration of Persons) said the best solution was for the refugees to return home, he likened sending Somalis back after 20 years while their country remained insecure to "eating a whole cow but being unable to eat the tail". "The return we are talking about is not a forced return," he said. There should be measures put in place that will ensure that once the refugees are repatriated, they don’t end up being IDPs in their country. Have these or such measures been put in place?

If we look deeply the outcome after the refugees go back to their “Home Land” whatever the challenge is (Positive or Negative side), there is a hope that Somalia

POLITICAL IMPACTS

The failure to put measures in place to ensure the safe landing of refugees once back in Somalia on the one hand and employing tactics in the refugee camps to force the refugees back into Somalia on the other do not appear to go by the spirit of voluntary repatriation as agreed upon in the Tripartite Agreement. To the refugees, living in the overcrowded, insecure and now, food-scarce camps, the double whammy of the ration cut plus the repatriation announcement seems like a conspiracy theory to force them back over the border. Donors have started making cuts on their provisions and have indicated that they will be making further cuts.

‘These camps are not safe and now you take away the only thing that is good? The food?’ An old man with one tooth and milky eyes wagged his finger at a WFP Worker. ‘We will go back to Somalia, and then we will return here, but when we return we will not be refugees, we will be Al-Shabaab and we will come for you.’ Such sentiments can only point to one thing and one thing only, that the security problem will not and cannot be solved by forcing back the Somali refugees into an unstable and insecure country. In fact this will be a good breeding ground for insecurity to rise in the region. The desperation of the returnees will provide a fertile ground for recruitment into the Al-Shabaab militia group. We can only take such sentiments lightly or ignore them to our own peril. Despite the increasing dangers and hardships of camp life, many of the refugees were not ready to return home.

"It is not safe there," said Muktar Ahmed, a 38-year-old resident of Ifo Camp. "Even though Dadaab is becoming insecure these days, we cannot choose to go to a more dangerous and battle-filled zone."

"I would not mind going back to my home country, but I don't want to be an internally displaced person (IDP)," said Farhan Mumin, a shopkeeper who has lived at Dadaab for two decades. "I will only go when the situation fully recovers.”

Kellie Leeson, deputy regional director for the International Rescue Committee said that it was a difficult situation when you have protracted refugee situations, especially where a clear resolution is not obvious and there’s no definitive end point. "Everybody agrees that a return to a safe and stable Somalia is the best long-term solution, but we don’t have that situation right now," she said.

Refugees are often viewed as a security threat to the host community. For example, the Turkana tribesmen accuse the Dinka (Sudanese ethnic group) in the Kakuma refugee camp of raping their women and cutting down trees. There have also been numerous cases of cattle rustling. Some locals further argue that they have been attacked during the night and had their cattle stolen. This perceived threat forces the locals to acquire illegal arms and thus sets conditions for terrorist groups to take advantage of the poor conditions at the camp to lure young men into their organizations.

ECONOMIC IMPACTS

While the High Court in January issued an injunction temporarily halting the relocation of refugees to camps, the psychological impact of the government’s directive has been devastating. It is akin to the “Quit Kenya” notices that were issued to Asians living in Nairobi in the 1960s, which led to a mass exodus of Asians from Kenya to Britain and other places. Eastleigh, a vibrant Somali-dominated neighbourhood where the shopping malls alone make an estimated $7 million (more than half a billion Kenyan shillings) a year, is slowly shutting down. Traders and shopkeepers are closing down their businesses and heading to Somalia.

Nairobi’s ethnic Somalis, like Kenya’s Asian community, are an entrepreneurial lot, who despite the poor infrastructure in Eastleigh, managed to create a local economy that is vibrant and globally connected to places such as the Middle East and China. Nairobi’s gross domestic product is deeply intertwined with that of Eastleigh. The dilemma facing Kenyan policymakers is how to deal with an urban refugee population that is an integral part of the country’s economy. The mass exodus of people and capital from Eastleigh could create the kind of economic stagnation and instability experienced by Uganda when Asians were expelled from the country in 1972 by Idi Amin’s regime.

SOCIO-CULTURAL IMPACTS

Increasing xenophobia among Kenyans, based on the perception that Somalis are taking over the economy, has also heightened tensions between Somali refugees and Kenyans. Reports indicate that the fear of persecution and physical harassment and bribe-taking by police have forced thousands of refugees to flee Nairobi. The refugees are not moving back to refugee camps based in remote, semi-arid parts of the country, but are heading back to Somalia.

A recent report by the Mogadishu-based Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS) think tank states that some 20,000 Somali refugees have voluntarily left Kenya since the repatriation call was made by Kenya’s Commissioner of the Department of Refugee Affairs last December. As a result, schools in Eastleigh are reporting reduced student numbers. A glut of empty apartments left behind by fleeing residents has also dramatically reduced rents in the area.

The unintended consequence of Kenyan police brutality is the deepening mistrust between them and Somali refugees. A majority of refugees interviewed by the think tank said that they would not cooperate with the police to identify terrorist suspects because they feared that the police would ask for “ransom” money. There are currently 33,537 Somali refugees registered in Nairobi, according to the report.

Forgetting and forgiving Siad Barre’s government aggression, Ethiopia decided to welcome hundreds of Somali refugees every day. Carrying the social, economic and environmental burden, the country allowed these refugees to build their huts near the graves of Ethiopian soldiers who sacrificed their lives during the invasion.

“We came to Ethiopia because it is our neighbor and more peaceful than Somalia at the moment,” says Abta Ali, 48, who traveled two days with eight children to reach Dollo Ado refugee transit center. “When we arrived, they gave us a meal prepared from rice, meat and potato.”

While the refugees receive international aid, the locals generally do not. This disparity causes an economic imbalance that has resulted in the host community being hostile and blaming its problems on the refugees. It also raises fundamental questions about human rights and equality, since the refugees, who receive free shelter, food, firewood, and health care, have better conditions than their hosts.

At the Kakuma refugee camp, refugees often have more opportunities for education than the locals. The refugees can go to local schools or they can attend one of the many schools in the refugee camp. However, the locals are not allowed to attend the schools in refugee camps. The host community suffers from poor quality education as compared to the refugees in refugee camps, since the refugees can access better teachers who, in most cases, come from urban areas or from foreign countries.

At the Kakuma refugee camp, job competition is intense because NGOs tend to hire refugees, who work for less than the locals. This disparity in employment opportunities causes additional tension between refugees and the host communities.

Methodology

For the data collection in the refugee camps and Eastleigh area in Nairobi, the research will adopt the Systematic random sampling design. This is a probability sampling technique and will allow the researchers to draw a sample of subjects who are willing to go back to Somalia (50%) and those who not willing to go back to Somalia (50%). This will help us to correlate the results and draw our conclusions. The study will target a total of 150 refugees in the three study sites with 75 subjects being those who are willing to go back to Somalia and the other 75 subjects being those not willing.

Data will be collected using structured questionnaires for the refugees and structured interviews will be used for the expert informants and key informants in the Ministries and UNHCR. The questionnaires are a faster and easier way to collect data from a large sample. The questionnaires will be administered and filled on the spot. Key informant interviews and in-depth interview are appropriate methods to gather data on a certain phenomenon or subject. These will used conducted at the experts’ convenience as well as the officials in the Ministries and UNHCR. The interviews will be recorded and transcribed by the researchers immediately after to capture all the information.

The data collected from the refugees will be sort into schemas, categories and patterns. It will then be coded and entered into the SPSS software which will be used to analyze the data. It will then be presented in form tables, charts, frequencies and percentages. The key informant and in-depth interviews will be sort into patterns and categories and interpreted. The interpretations will be made in a narrative format.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION

Repatriating the refugees to their countries of origin could be a lasting solution; however, the conditions in Somalia that made them seek refuge still prevail, and many refugees would not want to go back. Therefore, an enduring solution is to empower the population around the camps to mitigate the effects of harsh weather and to reduce the perception that the "intruders" benefit from better facilities and resources. The most certain and long-term solution is to resolve the Somalia conflict and create an elected government that is acceptable to all Somalis.

As the Tripartite Agreement states, the return to Somalia should be voluntary. It should not forced in any way or induced and coerced through tactics and strategies employed by the host government. While there may be problems associated with the presence of refugees in host countries, we should be careful not to exacerbate the problems by sending the refugees back into an unstable country. It will work against all the efforts that and milestones that have been covered so far in a bid to restore sanity, peace, security and stability in the war torn country. A desperate returnee would be more than willing to join the enemy rather than suffer due to the fact the government can offer him the security he so desires. This will ensure that the vicious cycle of violence continues unabated.

The question of assistance to be offered to the returnees also needs to be evaluated soberly. What assistance will be enough? What kind of assistance will it be? Somalia is made up of people with different forms of economic activities. The assistance you may offer a pastoralist to rebuild his life maybe different to the assistance you offer a farmer. Is the assistance for reconstruction varied or is it a case of “One size fits all approach?” This will also come into play in determining whether the returnee is able to settle down or continues suffering in the pretext of being repatriated.

While the conditions in places of origin may not yet be fully conducive for returns, there has been a growing interest among IDPs to return to their homelands, often prompted by factors such as overcrowding in IDP settlements, difficulties in accessing socio-economic activities in places of displacement, and more recently, the success of military interventions in liberating some areas previously under the control of insurgents. It is anticipated that 100,000 IDP households may want to return to their area of origin in 2013.UNHCR envisages providing return/reintegration packages to help increase the resilience of IDPs and mitigate the risks associated with spontaneous return.

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Saturday, 24 May 2014

REPATRIATION OF SOMALI REFUGEES